Startups and large companies: your end of the boat is sinking

I’ve worked at startups and I’ve worked at larger companies. I even worked at one company, VLSI Technology, where I joined it when it was a pre-IPO startup and left when it was thousands of people in tens of buildings. What is the difference? I think that the difference is best summed up in the jokey phrase “your end of the boat is sinking.”

People talk about the “risk” of joining a startup, but the main risk, unless you are vice-president level or you are joining before the company is funded, is simply that you’ll waste your time. You get paid pretty much the going rate for an engineer or a product marketing person or whatever you do. And you have some stock that will be worth a significant capital gain if the company is successful or nothing otherwise. If you are an executive, you get paid a lot less than the going rate in a big company. On the other hand, you have a lot of stock, 1-3% of the company for a vice-president, more for a hired-in CEO. Founders may have more than this depending on how much financing they end up needing to bring in. So for the senior people they really are losing something more than just time working for a startup.

Startups have two different dynamics from larger companies. The first is simply that they employ fewer people, pretty much by definition. Secondly, everyone’s personal and financial success, especially the management, is bound up in the success or otherwise of the company.

Employing fewer people means that in a startup there is nowhere to hide. Everyone knows everyone else and it is clear who is performing and who, if anyone, is trying to free-ride on everyone else’s efforts. In an environment like that, everyone is under pressure to perform. A startup can’t afford much headcount and if you are not going to perform at a high level, or for some other reason are not a good match, then it is best for the startup to find someone else who will.

The second dynamic, that everyone’s success is bound up with the company’s success, means that people naturally are working towards the same goal. Startups often struggle as to what that goal should be, and different management teams do more or less well at communicating it, but it is not necessary on a daily basis to micromanage everyone’s priorities. The natural DNA of a company that makes it operate in a particular way, which can be such a weakness in an Innovator’s Dilemma situation, is a benefit here. If you don’t tell people what to do there is a good chance they’ll do what they should do anyway.

In a larger company, your success as an individual (unless you are in senior management) comes largely from doing what your boss expects you to do. This may or may not have something directly to do with the success of the company, but it is not your job to second-guess that. If you want a salary increase and promotion you must work within the system.

So in a startup you don’t get “your end of the boat is sinking” behavior where people do what is good for their workgroup (division, site, product) at the expense of the good of the company. In a startup, where the boat is much smaller, everyone sees that the boat either floats or sinks and everyone is in it together. As a result, I find working in a startup is more fun than working in a larger company, at least unless you get senior enough to affect the large company strategy.

 

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EDA startups: seven million to takeoff

GraphA startup EDA company needs about $7M in bookings to become self-sustaining and not require another round of external funding. Curiously, it doesn’t seem to depend all that much on the product provided there is really a market out there, which, of course is by no means a given. And more funding can always be an accelerator to growth even if slow growth would have been possible without it.

The R&D team should be about 10 people. It will be less in the early days but it shouldn’t really be more unless the company truly must develop a range of products in parallel. With more than 10 people, engineering will be off developing a range of products even if that isn’t the plan!

With a CEO and another “person” in the form of an accountant, an office manager, a little marketing (they may be one person or more likely a few people part-time) that makes a total of 12-13 people, which is a fixed cost of around $2.5-3M per year. A single sales team is around $800K-1M per year as we saw earlier. With that headcount in place it takes about $3.5-4M to break even.

But a sales team only brings in $2M so $3.5M is more than one sales team can bring in so we need a second, at another $800K-1M pushing the breakeven up to $4.5M. This is just about doable but more likely a third sales team will be required, pushing revenue to $6M and expenses to $5.5M. Add in some inefficiencies in training salespeople, filling the funnel and the rule of thumb is that you need to get to about $7M to become cash-flow netural and the company start to be able to fund its own growth, albeit slowly.

But breakeven isn’t the end goal, being profitable enough to have options is. Then we can be acquired, or continue to grow the business or even just pay our shareholders nicely out of the profits. This means getting the business up to about $10-11M, which means about 5 sales teams. The 5 sales teams will cost about $4-5M, leaving $6M. That will pay the $3M original (non-sales) fixed cost with $1M for some additions to the corporate team: a marketing person, maybe some non-bag-carrying sales management, and after a couple of years somebody might want a pay raise. That leaves $2M to either take as profit or use to fund further growth, start a second product and so on.

All of this makes one big assumption. That the product is really ready at the point that the channel expenses are ramped up. It assumes that each salesperson rapidly makes it to the $2M per sales team level. This is where companies die though. If the sales teams are added too early then they will burn all the cash. If the product is not ready for the mainstream then the sales guys will not make it to the $2M level and burn all the cash. But if everything is in place then the company can get to $10M rapidly. The first year I was at Ambit we did $840K in revenue; the second year, $10.4M.

This is the point at which a company is very attractive for acquisition. It has traction in the market ($10M in sales and growing), the technology is proven (people are using lots of it; look, $10M in sales), the acquisition price hasn’t got too expensive yet (only $10M in sales), it is probably the market leader in its niche ($10M in sales and growing). Of  course if the company continues to grow it will typically take in more investment at this point in order to grow even faster. Value of a software company is some multiple of forward earnings, and the greater the growth the greater the multiple.

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ESL and software signoff

The DAC newsletter had a recent article on the ESL market. Gary Smith pointed out that one of the reasons that Cadence is struggling is that the fastest growing part of the market has been ESL, the most advanced design groups are using more and more ESL tools and Cadence has no offering in that space (although they have now introduced their CtoRTL product). Of course Gary is famous for predicting the last 5 booms in ESL but this time I think he might be right.

However, I think the problem may be worse than this, from an EDA perspective. The most advanced design groups such as Nokia and Apple, aren’t designing much at even the ESL level. Nokia has transferred its semiconductor design group to ST. Apple didn’t do much (any?) semiconductor design, as far as I know, in the iPhone and what they did in the iPod was subcontracted to eSilicon and PortalPlayer. The differentiation in most electronic systems is now in the software. But EDA companies can’t say this too loudly even if they realize it, since the bulk of their money comes from semiconductor designers.

The opportunity for EDA would be to expand to encompass the entire design process, at the very least the semiconductor, board, software subsystem, even if not the mechanical and manufacturing part. But nobody knows how to make money at this. It is probably a consulting business and it is quite possible that the current downturn will throw up someone who can put the pieces together. I’d bet on someone like PTC or Dassault rather than Synopsys or Cadence to do this though. They already see the bigger picture.

One missing link is modeling. To do software design for electronic products requires a model of the electronics, and it is hard to produce that automatically. As more transactional level SystemC modeling is done, and as technology from companies like Carbon improve, the models thrown off as a by-product of the semiconductor deign process are starting to be much more useful for this. ARM are switching to using automatically generated Carbonized models instead of writing their own cycle-level accurate models going forward, for example.

This moves us closer to what I call “software signoff” where the electronic design process becomes very software-centric. The purposes of semiconductors and microprocessors are simply to run the software fast enough and at low enough power to make the end-product successful. The underlying technology to do this is some mixture of high-level C/C++ synthesis, IP blocks, automatic assembly of peripherals, buses and device- drivers, modeling to link the hardware and software. In short, what we call ESL. But the perspective is a bit different. The purpose of software signoff is not to produce a chip for people to program, but rather to accelerate a software implementation with very little effort. Once the software implements what you need, it should be pushbutton (or at least fairly automatic) to build a chip or to map the software onto an existing platform.

I took a dig at Gary Smith for being early predicting huge growth for ESL, but I can remember preaching about software in semiconductor companies when I was at VLSI over a decade ago. So I was even further ahead of reality in predicting the move of differentiation to software.

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Twelve o’clock high

Three or four times in my life I’ve been given divisions or companies to run that have not been performing. Although it seems like an opportunity like that would be a poisoned chalice, it was actually a no-lose situation. If things went badly then I was drafted in too late. If things went well then I would be credited with the improvement. When expectations are so low it is not that hard to exceed them. Which is not at all the same thing as saying that improvement or success are easy.

When overnight I found myself as CEO of Compass Design Automation, one of my staff gave me the movie Twelve o’clock high in which Gregory Peck takes over a bomber squadron during the second world war and turns it around. The previous commander had become too close to his men to be effective as a commander. It won some Oscars and still worth watching today.

It is a lot easier to make the changes to an organization as a newly-drafted boss than it is to makes those changes if you were the person responsible for the early decisions. Everyone is human and we don’t like admitting that we made a mistake. We get emotionally attached to our decisions, especially to parts of the business that we rose up through or created. Nobody wants to kill their own baby. If you’ve ever fired someone that you hired or promoted, you probably discovered everyone around you thought, “what took you so long?” Reversing decisions that you made yourself tends to be like that.

As a newly drafted boss, morale will usually improve automatically just as a result of the change. Everyone knows lots of things that need to be changed and that were unlikely to be changed under the previous regime. It is a bit like the old joke about a consultant telling a manager something he already knows so that he can go ahead and do it. Just making some of those obvious changes fast creates a “things are going to be different” mentality.

The best example I know of the difficulty of reversing deeply ingrained decisions (without changing the leader) is in Andy Grove’s book Only the paranoid survive. If you are less than a certain age you probably are unaware that Intel was a memory company, initially very successfully and then struggling against Japanese competition. Intel meant memories then in the same way as it means microprocessors today. Here’s the scene. Andy Grove and Gordon Moore are in his office in 1985 discussing an upcoming board meeting. The business is going very badly:

I turned to Gordon and asked, “If we got kicked out and the board brought in a new CEO what do you think he would do?” Gordon answered without hesitation, “He would get us out of memories.” I stared at him numb then said “Why shouldn’t you and I walk out the door, come back and do it ourselves?”

It was an extraordinarily brave decision, and laid the ground for what Intel has become today. Usually that type of wrenching change does require a new CEO who has no emotional attachment to the earlier decisions.

At the end of Twelve o’clock high the Gregory Peck character is removed from command. He identifies too closely with his men to be effective as a commander. Time for a new commander.

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Guest blog: Doug Fairbairn

Doug Fairbairn was at Xerox PARC (along with Lynn Conway of Mead & Conway fame) when the VLSI design revolution began. He would go on to be one of the founders of VLSI Technology but he also realized that every revolution needs its printing press and so he created Lambda magazine. This is the first of two entries telling that story.

On a personal note, Doug hired me from Scotland to come and join his development team at VLSI Technology. I originally intended to come for a couple of years (this was 1982); I’m still here.

Click here for a pdf of the first issue of Lambda.

LAMBDA Fostered Structured Design Revolution

Today there would be websites, blogs, twitters, email blasts, etc., but in the late summer of 1979, when it came time to build a community around the rapidly expanding Mead-Conway Design Methodology, we didn’t have those options. OK, we had email to ARPAnet sites, but that was it. Text only, no graphics, with limited access. So what to do?

Along with several others at Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) and Caltech in Pasadena, we conceived the idea of a magazine focused on this new approach to IC design. We needed to reach a whole new community of designers—engineers who were interested in taking a systems approach to IC design…mapping architectures to silicon…silicon compilers….new types of design automation. There were lots of new ideas, articles to write, and excitement to share. Working through the mainstream publications was just not going to work.

Lambda magazine first coverIt probably seems shocking to most that we could formulate an idea and make plans to publish a magazine on a new design methodology from the confines of an industrial research lab. But for those of us at Xerox PARC, it was just a natural extension of what we were already doing. The lab had been in operation for eight or so years by then and its research focus was almost entirely internally directed. Whatever we thought was a good idea was what got done. That philosophy, combined with some of world’s best computer scientists, engineers, physicists and other researchers had already created the first personal workstation, Ethernet, laser printers, the optical mouse and many other building blocks of the personal computer revolution to come.

In fact it was this strong expertise in document creation and publishing that made the idea of a magazine seem downright reasonable. We found a Xerox group in Pasadena CA who had interfaced an optical typesetting machine to PARC’s Alto personal computer. They saw the new magazine as a way to work out the kinks and prove the value of computer-based typesetting. They agreed to help with the logistics, and most importantly pay for the layout and printing of the first four issues of LAMBDA.

I did clear the project with our lab director, Bert Sutherland, and figured with his approval I didn’t need to seek any further permission. Even at PARC, I knew if you asked enough people, there were certainly some who would find it outside our mission! As I remember, he had only one serious question: “What would I do after the first four quarterly issues?”. My response was practical, “If it is a roaring success, I’ll know what to do. If it’s a dismal failure, I’ll know what to do. If it’s somewhere in between, I’ll have to decide.” With that we were off and running.

The next step was content…starting with the cover. Given the title of LAMBDA (the scaling unit in the Mead/Conway design methodology), it was an easy choice to use the Chuck Seitz analogy comparing the network of interconnect with the grid of roads which made up a typical city. The cover showed four different scales for LAMDA from LAMBDA=12μ to Lambda=0.12μ. At the time LAMBDA was first published lambda values were approximately 2.5μ, implying minimum lines and spaces of 5μ. Moore’s law was well-recognized at the time, and we knew that dimensions would shrink well below a micron before scaling was done. In fact, the cover art envisioned lines and spaces of approximately 0.5μ. Today we are well beyond that – with lines and spaces less than 0.05μ! This implies 100x greater density than that envisioned on this early cover.

Note that even at 0.5μ dimensions, the complexity of an integrated circuit would be equivalent to covering the North American continent with streets at an urban density…. and we are 100x beyond that in today’s systems-on-chip. Our vision only went so far!

The magazine opened with a letter “from the editors”. We boldly forecasted that “In the near future we will see a radical upgrading of design aids”, a need “to develop new design methodologies… “ and “to turn our attention to higher level optimizations”. These seem obvious now, but at the time the universal focus on optimizing silicon area at all costs was still strongly in place, and would remain so for nearly a decade. We closed the editorial comments with the following paragraph:

“When design activity is localized within small groups in a few companies, formal communications mechanisms such as magazines are not appropriate. Now that integrated circuit design has broken those bounds and is actively practiced by a large number of people in diverse companies and universities, we feel that a magazine devoted strictly to their needs is required. LAMBDA is that magazine.”

The remainder of this first 32-page issue contained various news items, an update on university activities, and four feature articles on “IC Fabrication for the Independent Chip Designer” by Robert Hon, “Ideas About Arbiters” by Prof. Charles Seitz of Caltech, “The Design of a 16 x 16 Multiplier” by Rodney Masumoto of TRW, and “VTI Bets on Custom” by yours truly.

This last article is of particular note, as it outlined the business plan of a company, VLSI Technology Inc, that planned to offer foundry services to the new design community at which LAMBDA was targeted. As fate would have it, I became the fourth founder of this new company, quitting Xerox to join the new firm on about the same day (January 8th, 1980) the first issue of LAMBDA hit the streets.

Credits:  As with any great (ad)venture, this magazine was the work of many. I am particularly grateful for the support and nurturance provided by two people. First is Lynn Conway of Xerox PARC, without whom there would have been no book, no design revolution, and no magazine. Second to my long-time business partner and supporter, Jim Rowson. At the time the magazine was launched, Jim was at Caltech in Pasadena and a former consultant at PARC. He shared the load in launching the magazine, soliciting and editing articles, inputting text, sticking on mailing labels…whatever it took. For his wisdom, hard work, and support, I am eternally grateful.

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Pricing: vases and coffee pots

My father-in-law was an executive at Wedgwood and responsible, among other things, for pricing every piece of china they made. Wedgwood has recently been run into the ground by Waterford Crystal who had acquired it, and it is now in administration (roughly chapter 11), but that is another story.

Anyway, a Wedgwood coffee pot sold for $80 (I’m guessing these numbers). It is a complicated piece to make consisting of a body, a handle, a spout, a lid and a little piece that goes inside to stop all the coffee grounds going down the spout. However, if we throw away the lid, don’t bother to put on the spout, forget the handle and the little filter piece then we have a much simpler item. It’s a vase. It sells for $100. Paradoxically, the vase, which is much simpler to manufacture, has higher value to the consumer and so sells for a higher price.

It is important not to assume that the value to a customer of every product is a fixed industry markup over its cost. That will be true in a competitive mature market since any differentiation that leads to a higher price will get copied and competed away, but it is not true when products are differentiated. That is why it is so important to have differentiation, otherwise you are stuck selling silicon at a small markup to cost and you probably are not the lowest cost supplier. You either want to be Walmart (lowest cost supplier) or Whole Foods (lots of differentiation), not Safeway.

When I was at VLSI Technology in the late 1990s, one of the things I did was help run the strategic planning process for VLSI’s communication business (mostly GSM chips). We had a relationship with a French company called Wavecom that had a GSM software stack and a GSM radio design. VLSI made the baseband chip. At the time, understanding the GSM standard well enough to build a baseband chip was a big differentiation, and we were one of a couple of semiconductor companies with a standard product, which gave us some pricing power. But it was easy enough to see that, just as had happened in the PC chipset business, lots of competitors would enter the market and it would become a cutthroat cost-plus business. Digital design, no matter how complex, is not defensible for long. I told our communication group that we had better have a plan for acquiring Wavecom (which didn’t want to be acquired, certainly at any price we could afford) or else we should have a plan for finding a new software/RF partner since that is where the differentiation would move. Otherwise we would eventually get pushed out of the market. In the end Philips Semiconductors acquired VLSI in a hostile takeover, and they already had a software stack and RF and so the problem got solved that way. But it wasn’t a message the communication division wanted to hear since building those chips was so hard they wanted to believe that it would continue to be differentiation for a long time.

Software has a disadvantage over hardware in that the manufacturing cost is known. It is basically zero. All the cost of software is really an R&D cost being amortized over product sales. It is like a pharmaceutical business in that sense, pills that are incredibly expensive to formulate but incredibly cheap to manufacture. But unlike the pharmaceutical business where IP protection works, there is very little that can be done in practice to keep a product proprietary. It is thus hard to keep differentiation and pricing power for long. And hard even when there is no competition. Hardware accelerators such as Cadence’s Palladium or Eve’s products have a large hardware cost and sell for a high price. But despite that proven value, you know that if a software product had the same performance it would not sell at the same premium price point.

Of course these things are relative. In most software businesses, the prices we get for EDA tools are prices that other companies dream about. This is a challenge as the ESL market grows and starts to meld with the embedded software market. We may think a Verilog simulator is cheap, but it is a lot more expensive than a compiler or a debugger (even ignoring open source where the price is often zero). But that is a topic for another day.

The main implication for EDA is that the value of a product is determined by the customer not by the EDA company. There is plenty of pressure from customers to reduce prices on non-differentiated products, but very little from the EDA companies to get more return from the strongly differentiated products. Too many coffee pots and not enough vases.

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Technology of SOX

Sarbanes-Oxley, often abbreviated to SOX, is a set of accounting rules that were introduced by congress in response to the accounting scandals of Enron, Worldcom and their like during the dotcom boom. It is a mixture of different regulations, some concerned with how companies are audited, some concerned with liability a CEO and CFO have for irregularities in their companies, and so on. Many provisions are completely uncontroversial.

But the biggest problem, especially for startups, comes about from section 302 and 404. Section 302 says that companies must have internal financial controls, that the management of the company must have evaluated them in the previous 90 days. Section 404 says that management and the auditors must report on the adequacy and effectiveness of the internal controls.

In practice this means that auditors must repeatedly go over every minute piece of data, such as every cell in a spreadsheet, every line on every invoice, before they can sign off. For a small company, the audit fees for doing this are a minimum of $3M per year. For larger companies the amount grows, of course, but slowly so that it is much less burdensome for a large established company (where it might be 0.06% revenue) than for a small one.

Only public companies are required to comply with SOX so you could argue that it doesn’t matter that much for a small venture funded startup. At one level that is true. But it has also meant that a company has to be much larger to go public.

In the past, an EDA company with $20M in revenue and $3M in profit (with good growth) could go public. But now a private company like that must comply with SOX to go public, so that $3M cost suddenly hits and the company has $20M in revenue and no profit at all. It must wait until it is, perhaps, $80M in revenue with $12M in profit (which would have been $15M without SOX). In EDA, in particular, this is extremely difficult to achieve with a single product since most sub-markets are not that large. In effect, EDA companies can no longer go public.

This applies to many venture-backed startups in whatever industry. Since the introduction of SOX most IPOs have taken place in either London or Hong-Kong. It is controversial just how much of that is directly due to SOX but clear that a lot of companies that could have gone public in the past in the US have not done so, and as a result have been acquired for lower valuations that would otherwise have been the case.

In the early 2000s (SOX was passed in 2002) the stock market was not friendly to IPOs as it recovered from the downturn. But venture backed IPOs in 2005 and 2006 were way below what they were in the 1990s, and Q2 2008 was the first quarter in 30 years in which no venture-backed IPOs took place in the US. This has been another reason that VCs are rarely willing to invest in EDA companies.

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Visa. Priceless

It’s April 1st but apart from being an excuse for a lot of weak mildly humorous blog entries, today is also the day that applications for H-1 visas opens. And probably closes based on historical precedent.

The current downturn has lead to renewed focus in the H-1B visa cap, not to mention xenophobic restrictions slipped into the TARP bills to make the US even less welcoming. As I said in my previous entry about immigration, I think we have the worst of all worlds right now. The caps are so low that companies cannot use H-1 visas to hire talented people from overseas to work for them, they have become only a way for Asian subcontractors to get people in the to country and nothing much else. The entire year’s supply of visas goes in a day so the old model no longer works. It is no longer possible to find a talented person overseas, hire him or her, get a visa and set the start date a few weeks later. That is how I came to the US in the early 1980s. Now, the only model that works for a person like that is to hire them onto your overseas subsidiary (so don’t be a startup or you won’t have one) and after they have worked for a year it is possible to transfer them on an L-1 visa.

But people always tend to focus on the lowest level people and debate whether or not a person with an H-1 visa is taking a job away from an equally qualified American. In the old days the answer was certainly “no”, but now I’m not so sure. They are for sure taking a job away from an almost certainly more talented overseas employee who cannot get hired under the current visa system and who would be an unquestionable gain to the US as an immigrant.

However, immigrants create a lot of jobs for Americans too by their skill at founding or managing companies. In EDA, for example, Aart de Geus (CEO of Synopys) came from Switzerland, Lip-Bu Tan (CEO of Cadence) came from Singapore, Rajeev Madhavan (CEO of Magma) came from India. As far as I know, Wally Rhines (CEO of Mentor) is American born and bred. Some other sizeable EDA companies with immigrant CEOs are Attrenta (Ajoy Bose from India), Apache (Andrew Yang from China), Sequence (Vik Kulkarni from India), VaST (Alain Labatt from France), Virtutech (John Lambert from England).

I’m guessing that most of the immigrants originally came to this country either as students (so on an F-1 visa) or on an H-1 visa. Today we make it much too hard for the next generation of talented individuals overseas to come here and stay.

I think that over the next few years the problem with the US just as likely to be immigrants leaving the country, especially to return to India or Taiwan/China. This is already happening to some extent. Growth there is more attractive than here, and the infrastructure in the US for starting a business, thought better, is no longer so superior to everywhere else.

I think that the US’s capability to absorb talented individuals and make them successful is a competitive advantage no other country has. Everyone else must love the way we are handicapping ourselves these days. We are our own April fool joke, but not even mildly humorous.

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Process variation: you can’t ignore statistics any more

I like to say that “you can’t ignore the physics any more” to point out that we have to worry about lots of physical effects that we never needed to consider. But “you can’t ignore the statistics any more” would be another good rallying cry.

In the design world we like to pretend that the world is pass/fail. If you don’t break the design rules your chip will yield. If your chip timing works at the worst case corner then your chip will yield (yes, you need to look at other corners too).

But manufacturing is actually a statistical process and isn’t pass/fail at all. One area that is getting worse with each process generation is process variability especially in power and timing. If we look at a particular number such as the delay through a nand-gate then the difference between worse-case and typical is getting larger. The standard-deviation about the mean is increasing. This means that when we move from one process node to the next, the typical time improves by a certain amount but the worst-case time improves by much less. If we design to worst-case timing we don’t see much of the payback from the investment in the new process.

An additional problem is that we have to worry about variation across the die in a way we could get away with ignoring before. In the days before optical proximity correction (OPC) the variation on a die were pretty much all due to things that affected the whole die: the oxide was slightly too thick, the reticle was slightly out of focus, the metal was slightly over-etched. But with OPC, identical transistors may get patterned differently on the reticle, depending on what else is in the neighborhood. This means that when the stepper is slightly out of focus it will affect identical transistors (from the designer’s point of view) differently.

Treating worst-case timing as an absolutely solid and accurate barrier was always a bit weird. I used to share an office with a guy called Steve Bush who had a memorable image of this. He said that treating worse case timing as accurate to fractions of a picosecond is similar to the way the NFL treats first down. There is a huge pile of players. Somewhere in there is the ball. Eventually people get up and the referee places the ball somewhere roughly reasonable. And then they get out chains and see to fractions of in inch whether it has advanced ten yards or not.

Statistical static timing analysis (SSTA) allows some of this variability to be examined. There is a problem in static timing of handling reconvergent paths well, so that you don’t simultaneously assume that the same gate is both fast and slow. It has to be one or the other, even though you need to worry about both cases.

But there is a more basic issue. The typical die is going to be at a typical process corner. But if we design everything to worst case then we are going to have chips that actually have a much higher performance than necessary. But now that we care a lot about power this is a big problem: they consume more power than necessary giving us all that performance we cannot use. There has always been an issue that the typical chip has performance higher than we guarantee, and when it is important we bin the chips for performance during manufacturing test. But with increased variability the range is getting wider and when power rather than timing is important, too fast is a big problem.

One way to address this is to tweak the power supply voltage to slow down the performance to just what is required, along with a commensurate reduction in power. This is called adaptive voltage scaling (AVS). Usually the voltage is adjusted to take into account the actual process corner, and perhaps even the operating temperature as it changes. Once this is done then it is possible to bin for power as well as performance. Counterintuitively, the chips at the fastest process corner may well be the most power thrifty since we can reduce the supply voltage the most.

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Follow me

I’m not sure I really get Twitter completely. I think it’s an age thing. People brought up in Britain never get root beer; people brought up in America never get Marmite. Maybe you have to tweet before the age of 40 or something (which would have been impossible in my case).

But anyway, a secret that some of you already know since you follow me is that blog entries get pre-announced there, and sometimes other stuff.

So if you want to be ahead of the curve, follow me on Twitter. My username is paulmclellan. And while on the subject, my email is paul at greenfolder dot com.

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